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1. Introduction
Feminist legal theorists have long criticised the impact of gender stereotypes in
rape cases.1 Through their work and that of numerous dedicated others, many
people are now aware of the harm caused by stereotypes such as ‘women are
inherently untruthful and thus likely to fabricate allegations of rape’ and
‘women should physically resist sexual assault at every opportunity’. Yet, as
shown in KarenTayagVertido vThe Philippines,2 the most recent communication
decided under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women3 (‘Optional Protocol to CEDAW’),
stereotypical beliefs concerning rape are by no means a thing of the past.
* Simone Cusack is an independent human rights consultant. She is co-author (with Professor
Rebecca J. Cook) of Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) (simone_cusack@yahoo.com).
** Alexandra Timmer is a PhD candidate at the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, Belgium
(alexandra.timmer@ugent.be). The authors would like to thank Emily Dickson for her re-
search assistance, and Rachel Ball, Edwina MacDonald and Lisa Pusey for their insightful
comments on earlier drafts.
1 See, for example, Estrich, Real Rape: How the Legal System Victimizes Women Who Say No
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987).
2 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines (18/08), CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (2010).
3 2000, 2131 UNTS 83.
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Moreover, their resilience continues to harm women and impede their access
to justice for rape and other forms of sexual assault.
Vertido is now the leading decision of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW Committee’ or ‘the Committee’),4 and
arguably any international human rights treaty body,5 on addressing wrongful
gender stereotyping, although, as this short article explores, it does have sev-
eral shortcomings. What is interesting about Vertido is that both the author
and the CEDAW Committee put wrongful gender stereotyping at the heart of
the case; both framed the communication as one concerning the Philippines’
legal liability for judicial stereotyping in a rape trial, rather than for rape
only. Also interesting is the Committee’s application of the obligations to elim-
inate wrongful gender stereotyping in Articles 2(f)6 and 5(a)7 of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW)8 to the right to a fair trial. This application of Articles 2(f) and 5(a)
reminds us that gender stereotyping does not occur in a vacuum, and confirms
the Committee’s readiness to hold States Parties accountable for gender stereo-
typing that violates women’s human rights, even where those rights are not
explicitly recognised in the text of CEDAW.9
This note outlines the facts and views of the CEDAW Committee in the
Vertido case. The Committee’s views are discussed according to three major
themes: jurisdictional limitations under the Optional Protocol to CEDAW;
‘naming’ gender stereotyping in rape cases; and States Parties’ obligations to
4 Violations of Article 5(a) have previously been found in: A.T. v Hungary (2/03), CEDAW/C/32/D/
2/2003 (2005); 12 IHRR 998 (2005); and CEDAW Committee, Report on Mexico and Reply
from the Government of Mexico, 27 January 2005, CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (2005)
(‘Ciudad Jua¤ rez Inquiry’). Violations of Article 2(f) have been found in: FatmaYildirim vAustria
(6/05) CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (2007); S ahide Goekce v Austria (5/05), CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005
(2007); and the Ciudad Jua¤ rez Inquiry.
5 For good practice examples of addressing gender stereotyping at the regional and national
levels, see the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights: Case 11.625, Morales de Sierra v
Guatemala Report No 4/01 (2001); 9 IHRR 190 (2002); and Canadian Supreme Court: R v
Ewanchuk (1999) 1 SCR 330, at paras 68^102 (L’Heureux-Dube¤ J concurring).
6 Article 2(f) CEDAW provides that ‘States take ‘all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute dis-
crimination against women’.
7 Article 5(a) CEDAW provides that ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures . . . [t]o
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achiev-
ing the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women’.
8 1979, 1249 UNTS 13.
9 See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 28: Core Obligations of States Parties
under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, 19 October 2010, CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2 (2010) (advanced unedited version) at para
7 (providing that ‘[t]he spirit of the Convention covers other rights, which are not explicitly
mentioned in the Convention but which have an impact on the achievement of equality of
women with men and which represent a form of discrimination against women’).
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address wrongful gender stereotyping. The note concludes by reflecting critic-
ally on the degree to which the CEDAW Committee succeeds in employing a
transformative conception of equality.
2. Factual Background and Views of the CEDAW
Committee
Karen TayagVertido, the author, worked previously as Executive Director of the
Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Philippines. In 1996,
she filed a complaint with the local police, alleging that the then President of
the Chamber, Jose B. Custodio, had raped her following an evening business
meeting. The author alleged that the accused took her to a nearby motel in-
stead of giving her a lift home as promised. The author believed the accused
to be armed and refused to leave the car, but was allegedly dragged to a motel
room by the accused. Unable to find another exit, the author locked herself in
the bathroom. The author exited the bathroom only after she thought the
accused had left. However, the accused was still there and forcibly pinned her
to the bed. The weight of the accused caused the author to lose consciousness.
She alleged that when she regained consciousness the accused was already
raping her. The author’s pleas to stop were ignored and she was initially unsuc-
cessful in her attempts to push him away. The author eventually succeeded in
freeing herself, but only after she had been raped. She underwent a medical
and legal examination the following day and reported the rape to police
within 48 hours.
A panel of public prosecutors initially dismissed the matter for lack of prob-
able cause. On appeal, the Secretary of the Department of Justice ordered that
the accused be charged with rape. A motion for reconsideration was denied
and the accused was subsequently arrested. The case languished in the trial
court for eight years before Judge Virginia Hofilen‹ a-Europa finally ruled in
April 2005.10 Her Honour acquitted the accused, citing insufficient evidence
to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of rape.
Judge Europa based her decision to acquit on several ‘guiding principles’
derived from other rape cases (for example, that rape allegations are easy to
make) and her unfavourable assessment of the author’s testimony based,
among other things, on the author’s failure to take advantage of perceived
opportunities to escape from the accused.
The author subsequently submitted a communication to the CEDAW
Committee, alleging that the acquittal of the accused constituted a violation, by
the Philippines, of the rights to non-discrimination and an effective remedy,
10 Regional Trial Court Davao City, the Philippines,The People of the Philippines v Jose B. Custodio,
Criminal Case No 37,921^96, 11 April 2005.
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and the freedoms from wrongful gender stereotyping and gender-based vio-
lence against women.11 Of particular relevance for present purposes is the au-
thor’s claim that Judge Europa’s decision had no basis in law or fact and ‘was
grounded in gender-based myths and misconceptions about rape and rape
victims . . .without which the accused would have been convicted’.12
In considering the author’s claim of wrongful gender stereotyping, a major-
ity of the CEDAW Committee affirmed that CEDAW requires States Parties to
‘take appropriate measures to modify or abolish not only existing laws and
regulations, but also customs and practices that constitute discrimination
against women’.13 It also stressed that
stereotyping affects women’s right to a fair and just trial and that the
judiciary must take caution not to create inflexible standards of what
women or girls should be or . . .have done when confronted with a situ-
ation of rape based merely on preconceived notions of what defines a
rape victim . . .14
Turning its attention to the particular facts, the majority determined that
Judge Europa expected a certain stereotypical behaviour from the author and
formed a negative view of her creditability because she had not behaved
accordingly. The majority reasoned that
the assessment of the credibility of the author’s version of events was
influenced by a number of stereotypes, the author in this situation not
having followed what was expected from a rational and ‘ideal victim’ or
what the judge considered to be the rational and ideal response of a
woman in a rape situation . . .15
The majority went on to say that Judge Europa’s decision contained ‘several
references to stereotypes about male and female sexuality being more support-
ive for the credibility of the alleged perpetrator than for the creditability of
the victim’.16 Singling out Judge Europa’s reliance on the stereotype that
women should physically resist rape and other forms of sexual assault at
every opportunity, the Committee reasoned that to expect the author to have
physically resisted the accused perpetuates that stereotypical belief.17
The majority therefore concluded that the Philippines had violated its obli-
gations under Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW to eliminate wrongful gender
11 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at paras 3.1^3.17.
12 Ibid. at paras 3.4^3.5.
13 Ibid. at para 8.4.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. at para 8.5.
16 Ibid. at para 8.6.
17 Ibid. at para 8.5.
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stereotyping, as well its obligation under Article 2(c) to provide effective reme-
dies. It recommended that the Philippines adopt a wide range of measures,
including to ensure ‘that all legal procedures in cases involving crimes of rape
and other sexual offenses are impartial and fair, and not affected by prejudices
or stereotypical gender notions’.18
3. Jurisdictional Limits of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW
The ability of the CEDAW Committee to decide communications under the
Optional Protocol is subject to certain jurisdictional limitations. Some of those
limitations are enumerated in the text of the Protocol itself, for example, the
stipulation that the Committee consider communications alleging violations
of CEDAW only against States Parties to the Optional Protocol.19 Others arise
independently of the Protocol and will evolve as the Committee develops and
expands its jurisprudence, including through application of principles
well-established in international human rights jurisprudence, as in theVertido
case.
The particular jurisdictional limitation raised in Vertido concerned the
extent of the CEDAW Committee’s authority to assess and review findings of
fact or law in domestic proceedings, when deciding communications under
the Optional Protocol. This issue is not addressed in the Optional Protocol,20 al-
though there is a long line of human rights jurisprudence that provides that
it is generally for domestic courts, and not international or regional human
rights bodies, to assess and review the facts and evidence in a particular
case.21 It is not intended that treaty bodies operate as appellate courts or
courts of fourth instance.22 This line of jurisprudence takes into account that,
as quasi-judicial bodies that review written evidence only, treaty bodies are ‘in
a worse position to assess findings, especially findings of fact, than a domestic
court’.23 It also accounts for the limited resources of treaty bodies. As CEDAW
Committee member Yoko Hayashi reminded us in her concurring opinion in
Vertido, ‘[t]he Committee is not equipped to examine the testimony of [the]
18 Ibid. at para 8.9(b).
19 See, for example, Article 3.
20 See Articles 2^4.
21 See, for example, Semey Joe Johnson v Spain (1102/02), CCPR/C/86/D/1102/2002 (2006) at para
6.4; Rafael Marques de Morais v Angola (1128/02), CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (2005); 12 IHRR
644 (2005) at para 5.5; Griffin v Spain (493/92), CCPR/C/53/D/493/1992 (1995); 2 IHRR 571
(1995) at para 9.6; Narrainen v Norway (3/91), CERD/C/44/D/3/1991 (1994); 1-3 IHRR 128
(1994) at paras 9.4^9.5; Aksu v TurkeyApplication Nos 4149/04 and 41029/04, Merits, 27 July
2010 at para 55 (referred to the Grand Chamber), and Krawczak v Poland Application No
40387/06, Merits, 8 April 2008 at para 37.
22 See Joseph, Schultz and Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases,
Materials and Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 22^3.
23 Ibid.
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parties concerned, nor to evaluate the credibility of the accused or the
author’.24
Notwithstanding, human rights treaty bodies and courts have found that
they do have a valid role to play in reviewing domestic court decisions in lim-
ited circumstances.25 For example, the Human Rights Committee, the body
monitoring implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, has indicated a willingness to step into the shoes of a domestic
court if it is apparent that a decision was manifestly arbitrary or amounted to
a denial of justice, or that a court otherwise violated the obligation of inde-
pendence and impartiality.26 The carving out of those exceptions enables
the Human Rights Committee to hold States accountable for fundamental
errors of judicial branches of government. Still, international jurisprudence
reveals that the Committee has typically exercised caution with respect to the
findings and rulings of domestic courts, interfering only in cases of clear
unfairness.27
In her communication to the CEDAW Committee, the author claimed that if
it were not for Judge Europa’s reliance on gender stereotypes, the accused
would have been convicted of raping her.28 Whether intentionally or not, the
author effectively invited the Committee to assess and review the facts and evi-
dence before Judge Europa. Responding to the invitation, the majority clarified
that it is not its role to ‘replace . . . domestic authorities in the assessment
of facts’ or ‘decide on the alleged perpetrator’s criminal responsibility’.29
The Committee went on to say that, in performing its role as an adjudicator of
communications under the Protocol, it would
consider the author’s allegations that gender-based myths and miscon-
ceptions about rape and rape victims were relied on by Judge
Hofilen‹ a-Europa . . . leading to the acquittal of the alleged perpetrator,
and [would] determine whether this amounted to a violation of the
rights of the author and a breach of the corresponding State party’s obli-
gations to end discrimination in the legal process under articles 2(c),
2(f) and 5(a) of the Convention.30
Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the majority drew a distinction
between placing itself in the shoes of Judge Europa and deciding if her
24 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2.
25 See supra n 21.
26 See, for example, Semey Joe Johnson v Spain, supra n 21 at para 6.4; Rafael Marques de Morais v
Angola, supra n 21 at para 5.5; and Griffin v Spain, supra n 21 at para 9.6.
27 See, for example, Joseph, Schultz and Castan, supra n 22 at 416.
28 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at para 3.5 (alleging that ‘the Court relied on
the gender-based myths and stereotypes . . .without which the accused would have been
convicted’).
29 Ibid. at para 8.2.
30 Ibid.
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Honour’s reliance on gender stereotypes violated CEDAW. In limiting its deter-
mination to the latter, the majority legitimately exercised its power to hold the
Philippines legally accountable, under CEDAW, for the gender stereotyping by
Judge Europa, a member of its judicial branch of Government. A challenge for
the CEDAW Committee in deciding future communications concerns whether
and, if so, when judicial stereotyping might require the Committee to step
into the shoes of domestic courts, in order to assess and review findings of
fact or law.
4. Naming Gender Stereotyping31
CEDAWobliges States Parties to eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping,32 that
is to say, the process of ascribing to an individual specific attributes, character-
istics or roles by reason only of his or her sex/gender, in ways that infringe
human rights.33 The CEDAW Committee has interpreted the obligation to ‘ad-
dress prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-based stereo-
types’ as being one of three obligations central to States Parties’ efforts to
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.34 It is not surprising,
then, that the obligation to eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping has sur-
faced in several communications and an inquiry under the Optional Protocol
to CEDAW35 as well as under the reporting procedure36 and in General
Recommendations37 of the CEDAW Committee. Yet,Vertido is the first CEDAW
31 See Cook and Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) at 39 (arguing that ‘[t]he ability to eliminate a
wrong is contingent on it first being ‘‘named,’’ by which is meant that a particular experience
has been identified and publicly acknowledged as a wrong in need of legal and other forms
of redress and subsequent prevention’).
32 See Articles 2(f), 5(a) and 10(c), CEDAW.
33 See Cook and Cusack, supra n 31 at 9^31. Cook and Cusack use ‘gender stereotyping’ as an
umbrella term that encompasses sex stereotyping, sexual stereotyping, sex-role stereotyping
and compounded stereotyping.
34 See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 25: Temporary Special Measures (art 4,
para 1), A/59/38 Part I (2004); 11 IHRR 909 (2004) at para 7. The other two obligations cen-
tral to State Parties’ efforts to eliminate discrimination against women are ‘to ensure that
there is no direct or indirect discrimination against women in their laws and that women
are protected against discrimination . . .by competent tribunals as well as sanctions and
other remedies’and ‘to improve the de facto position of women through concrete and effective
policies and programmes’: see ibid. See also Holtmaat, ‘The CEDAW Convention’s Holistic
Approach to Equality and Non-Discrimination’, in Hellum and Sinding Aasen (eds),The Added
Value of CEDAW (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
35 See supra n 4.
36 See Article 18, CEDAW. See, for example, CEDAWCommittee, Concluding Observations regard-
ing the Czech Republic, 10 November 2010, CEDAW/C/CZE/CO/5 (2010) at paras 20^1 and 29;
and CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations regarding Tunisia, 5 November 2010,
CEDAW/C/TUN/CO/6 (2010) at paras 24^5.
37 See Article 21, CEDAW. See, for example, CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation
No 25, supra n 34 at para 7.
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communication in which wrongful gender stereotyping and States Parties’
obligations to eliminate that practice have been a central focus.38
The author’s legal strategy of expressly naming gender stereotyping appears to
have set her communication apart from earlier communications and inquiries
in which States Parties’ obligations to address wrongful gender stereotyping
were addressed. In her communication to the CEDAW Committee, the author
focused on a particular form of gender stereotyping, namely sexual stereotyp-
ing.39 In so doing, she identified a number of sexual stereotypes, including:
 women should physically resist sexual assault at every opportunity, which
implies that failure to take advantage of perceived opportunities to escape
from an alleged attacker is evidence that the woman was not raped;40
 women are inherently untruthful and thus likely to fabricate allegations of rape,
which implies that rape allegations made by women should automatically
be viewed with suspicion;41 and,
 older men lack sexual prowess, which implies that an allegation of rape made
against an older man must be unfounded because his age means he is not
capable of committing rape.42
The author also identified a number of related rape ‘myths’,43 including the
myth that perpetrators of rape are strangers, which implies that any sexual rela-
tions between persons who are ‘more than nodding acquaintances’44 must
have been consensual and, therefore, not rape.
The author was able to identify those stereotypes and myths because she
rigorously examined the sexual attributes, characteristics and roles that Judge
Europa had ascribed to her and the accused. Once identified, the author elabo-
rated the meaning and significance of each of the ascriptions.45 She also
demonstrated how gender stereotyping harmed her (for example, by justifying
the acquittal of the accused),46 and other rape victim/survivors (for example,
38 See Cook and Cusack, supra n 31 at 156^60, 165^72 (for a critique of the CEDAW Committee’s
approach to gender stereotyping in A.T. v Hungary, supra n 4 and the Ciudad Jua¤ rez Inquiry,
supra n 4). Cf. Cristina Mun‹ oz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicun‹ a v Spain, supra n 4 (Member Shanthi
Dairiam dissenting).
39 See Cook and Cusack, supra n 31 at 27 (providing that ‘[s]exual stereotypes endow men and/
or women with specific sexual characteristics or qualities that play a role in sexual attraction
and desire, sexual initiation and intercourse, sexual intimacy, sexual possession, sexual as-
sault, transactional sex . . .and sexual objectification and exploitation’).
40 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at para 3.5.1.
41 Ibid. at paras 2.9 and 3.5.8.
42 Ibid. at para 3.5.7.
43 The term‘myth’ refers to ‘a widely held but false belief’: see Oxford Dictionary of Current English,
9th edn (Oxford/NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2001). Compare the definition of ‘gender
stereotype’ used in Section 4 above. Gender stereotypes can be accurate or false: Cook and
Cusack, supra n 31 at 16^7.
44 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at para 3.5.4.
45 See ibid. at paras 3.5.1^3.5.8.
46 See ibid. at paras 3.1^3.7.
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by placing ‘rape victims at a legal disadvantage and significantly reduc[ing]
their chances of obtaining redress for the violation they suffered’47).
An analysis of the author’s strategy of naming gender stereotyping suggests
that she understood that treating the harms of this practice required first that
it be diagnosed as a social harm.48 She appreciated, as Cook and Cusack have
argued, that ‘[n]aming a stereotype is necessary in much the same way that
a medical diagnosis is required before medical treatment can be applied’.49
The success of the author’s strategy is evidenced in the consideration of the
merits, where the majority expressly named and scrutinised several of the
stereotypes identified by the author.50 For example, focusing primarily on
Judge Europa’s reliance on the prescriptive sexual stereotype that women
should physically resist sexual assault at every opportunity, the Committee rea-
soned that ‘to expect the author to have resisted . . . reinforces . . . the myth
that women must physically resist . . . sexual assault’.51 The views of the major-
ity in Vertido can be contrasted with earlier communications, such as A.T. v
Hungary52 or S ahide Goekce v Austria,53 where wrongful gender stereotyping
was raised in the context of domestic violence, but specific stereotypes were
not named and their harms were not elaborated.54
In the course of identifying the operative sexual stereotypes, the author
drew attention to the broader context in which gender stereotyping occurs in
the judicial system of the Philippines. She submitted to the CEDAW
Committee that the decision of Judge Europa ‘is one among many trial court
decisions in rape cases that discriminate against women and perpetuate dis-
criminatory beliefs about rape victims’.55 The author included information in
her communication about seven rape cases decided between 1999 and 2007
to illustrate the pervasiveness of judicial stereotyping in the Philippines.56
Through analysis of the broader context of stereotyping, the author attempted
to demonstrate that judges have saturated Filipino law with harmful sexual
stereotypes, resulting in their continued perpetuation. In so doing, she urged
the Committee to recommend that the Philippines adopt measures to eliminate
wrongful gender stereotyping across the entire judiciary.57
Regrettably, however, the CEDAWCommittee did not take the opportunity to
consider the role the judiciary has played in systematically perpetuating
47 Ibid. at para 3.9.
48 See Cook and Cusack, supra n 31 at 40.
49 Ibid. at 175.
50 See Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at paras 8.1 and 8.8.
51 Ibid. at para 8.5.
52 A.T. v Hungary, supra n 4.
53 S ahide Goekce vAustria, supra n 4.
54 But see Cristina Mun‹ oz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicun‹ a v Spain (7/05), CEDAW/C/39/D/7/2005 (2007)
(Member Shanthi Dairiam dissenting).
55 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at para 3.8.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid. at paras 3.15^3.16.
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sexual stereotypes in rape cases. Instead, the Committee framed its decision in
terms of Judge Europa’s stereotyping only. Despite this, several of the
Committee’s recommendations do call on the Philippines to take steps to ad-
dress systemic stereotyping, including the call to ‘[e]nsure that all legal proced-
ures in cases involving crimes of rape and other sexual offenses are impartial
and fair, and not affected by prejudices or stereotypical gender notions’.58 Had
the Committee examined the broader context in which sexual stereotypes op-
erate in the Filipino judiciary and how they have been perpetuated through
rape cases (and not just theVertido case), it could have articulated the nature
and scope of States Parties’ obligations, under Articles 2(f) and 5(a), to address
systemic wrongful gender stereotyping in the judicial system, and targeted its
recommendations accordingly.
In Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives, Cook and Cusack
argue that
[n]aming wrongful gender stereotyping . . . is central to the effectiveness
of efforts to eliminate this practice. Unless wrongful gender stereo-
typing is diagnosed as a social harm, it will not be possible to determine
its treatment and bring about its elimination.59
They assert that ‘the ability to eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping is con-
tingent on the nature, forms, causes, and effects of stereotypes being exam-
ined.’60 Karen Vertido understood the importance of this naming process and,
consequently, put forward a rigorous analysis of wrongful gender stereotyping
in rape cases in the Philippines. As we endeavour to hold more States Parties
accountable for wrongful gender stereotyping by public (and private) authori-
ties, a lot can be learnt from the way the author framed her communication.
The CEDAW Committee, for its part, is to be applauded for putting the issue of
wrongful gender stereotyping at the centre of its decision. It is unfortunate,
however, that the Committee did not take this opportunity to expand more
on the topic, for example, by articulating the obligations to address systemic
judicial stereotyping.
5. Due Diligence and Obligations to Address Wrongful
Gender Stereotyping
The concept of due diligence has played an important role in holding States le-
gally accountable where they have failed to act diligently to prevent, investi-
gate, punish and remedy violations of women’s rights by private actors. First
developed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 1988 case of
58 Ibid. at para 8.9(b) (emphasis added).
59 Cook and Cusack, supra n 31 at 40.
60 Ibid.
10 of 14 HRLR (2011)
Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras on forced disappearance,61 the due diligence
standard has since been applied widely in the context of gender-based violence
against women, including in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women,62 the jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee63 and the
work of the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences.64 In its General Recommendation No 28 on State obligations,
the CEDAW Committee built on this substantive body of human rights law to
explain that the concept of due diligence refers to the
obligation on States parties to prevent discrimination by private actors. In
some cases a private actor’s acts or omission of acts may be attributed to
the State under international law. States parties are thus obliged to ensure
that private actors do not engage in discrimination against women, as
defined in the Convention.65
In its discussion of States Parties’ obligations in Vertido, the CEDAW
Committee appears to affirm that there is a due diligence obligation inherent
in Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW to address wrongful gender stereotyping
by private actors.66 This pronouncement is significant as it signals a willing-
ness on the part of the CEDAW Committee to broaden the application of
the due diligence standard beyond gender-based violence against womenç
something that feminist legal scholars have encouraged.67 However, in the pre-
sent authors’ view, the Committee misinterpreted the standard in the Vertido
case. The majority remarked in its views that
the compliance of the State party’s due diligence obligation to banish
gender stereotypes on the grounds of articles 2(f) and 5(a) needs to be
assessed in . . . light of the level of gender sensitivity applied in the judicial
handling of the author’s case.68
61 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras IACtHR Series C 4 (1988) at para 172.
62 GA Res 48/104, 23 February 1994, A/RES/48/104, at Article 4.
63 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women, A/47/38 at
1 (1993); 1-1 IHRR 24 (1994), at para 9; Fatma Yildirim v Austria, supra n 4; S ahide Goekce v
Austria, supra n 4; A.T. v Hungary, supra n 4; and Ciudad Jua¤ rez Inquiry, supra n 4.
64 See, for example, Commission on Human Rights, The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for
the Elimination of Violence against Women, Report by the Special Rapporteur on Violence
against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertu« rk, 20 January 2006, E/CN.4/2006/
61 (2006).
65 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 28, supra n 9 at para 13.
66 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at para 8.4.
67 See Byrnes, Graterol and Chartres, ‘State Obligation and the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women’, UNSW Law Research Paper No 2007^48
(2007) at para 130; and Holtmaat, ‘Preventing Violence against Women: The Due Diligence
Standard with Respect to the Obligation to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of
Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention’, in Benninger-Budel (ed), Due Diligence and Its
Application to ProtectWomen fromViolence (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) at 63.
68 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at para 8.4.
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From this statement, it appears that the majority is suggesting that the due
diligence obligation is applicable to the decision of Judge Europa. Yet, as a
member of the Filipino judiciary and therefore a State actor, Judge Europa’s
wrongful gender stereotyping is directly attributable to the Philippines; that is
to say, there is no need to invoke the due diligence standard, as the State
Party is automatically liable for the actions of its own agents and officials.
However, had the case concerned the State’s liability for its failure to protect
against wrongful gender stereotyping by a private actor (for example, an
employer), the majority would have been justified in its application of the
standard.
It is not only the Committee’s misinterpretation of the due diligence obliga-
tion, but also its conflation of different types of State obligations that causes
confusion in theVertido case. There are three types of obligations that are rele-
vant to the case. The first is the obligation imposed on all branches and levels
of government to refrain from wrongful gender stereotyping. This is distinct
from both the obligation to act with due diligence to protect against wrongful
gender stereotyping by private actors and to act with due diligence to protect
women against gender-based violence, including rape, by private actors. As
Vertido primarily concerns the first of those types of obligations, it is puzzling
why the majority dismissed the author’s allegation of a violation of Article
2(d) of CEDAW (which requires States Parties to ensure that its organsç
including the judiciaryçrefrain from discrimination), as being less relevant
than the other alleged violations.
How, then, might the majority have taken advantage of the opportunity in
Vertido to articulate the nature, scope and extent of States Parties’ obligations
in respect of wrongful gender stereotyping? One approach might have been to
enumerate States Parties’obligations in Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAWaccord-
ing to the well-known tripartite framework of the obligations to ‘respect, pro-
tect and fulfill’.69 The Committee might have explained, for instance, that the
obligation to respect requires States Parties
not to enact or enforce laws that institutionalise harmful gender stereo-
types, and to reform or repeal laws that contain them. It further entails
taking steps to ensure that policies, regulations, programmes, adminis-
trative procedures and institutional structures are not based on gender
stereotypes, and to rescind or alter those that are.70
In articulating States’obligations, it would have been helpful for the majority to
identify the differences in the obligations imposed on States Parties under
Articles 2(f) and 5(a), and consider when gender stereotyping might be
69 See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 28, supra n 9 at para 9. See also Cook
and Cusack, supra n 31 at 76^84.
70 See Cusack, ‘CEDAW as a Legal Framework for Transnational Discourses on Gender
Stereotyping’, in Hellum and Sinding Aasen, supra n 34.
12 of 14 HRLR (2011)
justified under CEDAW. In addition, the Committee might have clarified that
States Parties can be held directly accountable for the wrongful gender stereo-
typing of state agents and officials and persons acting on behalf of govern-
ments, and indirectly accountable for wrongful gender stereotyping of private
actors (for example, media employers) if they fail to act diligently to prevent,
investigate, punish and remedy related violations of women’s rights.
Finally, a note about the due diligence obligation to prevent, investigate,
punish and remedy gender-based violence against women perpetrated by pri-
vate actors. In the words of the Committee, this obligation ‘needs to be assessed
in . . . light of the level of gender sensitivity applied in the judicial handling of
the author’s case’.71 It is worth noting that with this approach, the CEDAW
Committee takes a step beyond the approach taken by the European Court of
Human Rights. The central issue in the 2003 judgment of M.C. v Bulgaria was
the State’s positive obligations in cases of acquaintance rape.72 The European
Court, unlike the CEDAW Committee, based its finding that Bulgaria had vio-
lated its positive obligations under the European Convention on Human
Rights73 primarily on the fact that the Bulgarian judicial authorities took phys-
ical resistance rather than lack of consent, as the central defining element of
rape.74 The CEDAW Committee could have done the same in Vertido, as the
Filipino judge also focused on the seeming lack of physical resistance. Instead,
the CEDAW Committee went further, in that it dismantles the gendered
assumptions that form the basis of the focus on resistance:
[T]he Committee finds that to expect the author to have resisted in the
situation at stake reinforces in a particular manner the myth that
women must physically resist the sexual assault. In this regard, the
Committee stresses that there should be no assumption in law or in prac-
tice that a woman gives her consent because she has not physically
resisted the unwanted sexual conduct, regardless of whether the
perpetrator threatened to use or used physical violence.75
If we want to make progress in eradicating and punishing violence against
women, it is vitally important that this type of gender analysis is applied con-
sistently. The example set by the CEDAW Committee is to be applauded and it
is to be hoped that other human rights treaty bodies and courts will follow.
To reiterate: the obligation on State agents and officials to refrain from
wrongful gender stereotyping is distinct from the obligation to act with due
diligence to protect against wrongful gender stereotyping by private actors
71 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at para 8.4.
72 M.C. v Bulgaria 2003-VII; 40 EHRR 20.
73 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, 2 UNTS
221.
74 M.C. v Bulgaria, supra n 72 at paras 178^85.
75 Karen TayagVertido v The Philippines, supra n 2 at para 8.5.
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and the due diligence obligation to protect against gender-based violence
against women perpetrated by private actors. In so far as the CEDAW
Committee suggests that the due diligence standard should be applied in the
gender stereotyping context, this is an exciting development that is to be cele-
brated. What is needed, now, is for the CEDAW Committee to develop the
scope and content of the obligations to address wrongful gender stereotyping,
including the due diligence obligation.
6. Conclusion
In the literature on CEDAW, feminist legal scholars have developed the concept
of ‘transformative equality’.76 Fredman describes this as
re-structuring society so that it is no longer male-defined. Transformation
requires a redistribution of power and resources and a change in the
institutional structures which perpetuate women’s oppression.77
In other words, transformative equality is aimed at disrupting the status quo.78
Though the decision in Vertido holds great transformative potential through
its focus on wrongful gender stereotyping, in the end it does not reach this po-
tential. One reason the decision falls short in this respect is that the CEDAW
Committee failed to address systemic stereotyping of rape victims in the
Philippines judiciary. Another reason is that the Committee did not explain
the nature and scope of the due diligence obligation as applied to wrongful
gender stereotyping. Because the Committee does not address the systemic
nature of judicial gender stereotyping in the Philippines or point States
Parties to appropriate tools to address wrongful gender stereotyping in the
private sphere, in some ways, the structural discrimination of women in gen-
eral, and rape victims/survivors in particular, is left intact. Nevertheless,
Vertido provides an important contribution and fresh impetus to jurisprudence
on gender stereotyping. It also serves as a reminder of the challenges confront-
ing us as we seek to navigate the road to a re-structured society that is no
longer male defined.
76 See, for example, Holtmaat, supra n 34.
77 Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New
Definition of Equal Rights’, in Boerefijn et al. (eds), Temporary Special Measures: Accelerating
de facto Equality of Women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination againstWomen (Antwerp/Oxford/NewYork: Intersentia, 2003) at 115.
78 Otto, ‘Rethinking the ‘‘Universality’’ of Human Rights Law’ (1997^1998) 29 Columbia Human
Rights Law Review 1 at 19.
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